The world generated by perception is not the world 'as it is'.
The world 'as it is' is infinite, the world as perceived is finite.
What we perceive is a fragment of an infinite potential; the world in entirety is not perceptible.
Yet we are also part of the world in entirety.
And what we perceive is the world as it is, since we are the world as it is.
Saturday, 31 January 2009
Ruskin on Science, Art and Literature
"In science, you must not talk before you know. In art, you must not talk before you do. In literature, you must not talk before you think...
Science: The knowledge of things, whether Ideal or Substantial.
Art: The modification of Substantial things by our Substantial Power.
Literature: The modification of Ideal things by our Ideal Power."
John Ruskin, Deucalion - King of the Golden River and the Eagle's Nest, 1872, p. 303
Science: The knowledge of things, whether Ideal or Substantial.
Art: The modification of Substantial things by our Substantial Power.
Literature: The modification of Ideal things by our Ideal Power."
John Ruskin, Deucalion - King of the Golden River and the Eagle's Nest, 1872, p. 303
Thursday, 29 January 2009
Monday, 26 January 2009
Perception and the appearance of reality
Studies of animal vision suggest that different species have very different visual experiences of the world. Cats and dogs, for example, are red-green colour blind, although they see more in the periphery and at night, while snakes can 'see' infrared frequencies at night although not things that keep still. Horses, with eyes at each side of the head, see a greater panorama than humans, while insects like flies and bees have compound eyes which make up a mosaic-like image composed of many individual units. Some insects, like butterflies, see more colours than us, while others, like bees, see less but can see in the ultraviolet spectrum.
What appears to humans, with our particular perceptual apparatus, as reality will appear quite different to another species. Something that is an object to us may not be to a fly, and vice versa. This tells us that the way the world is divided up according to human perception is not the only way it can be divided up, and that in fact what constitutes reality is something of a moveable feast depending on the structure of the perceptual systems being used. Reality is subjective.
What appears to humans, with our particular perceptual apparatus, as reality will appear quite different to another species. Something that is an object to us may not be to a fly, and vice versa. This tells us that the way the world is divided up according to human perception is not the only way it can be divided up, and that in fact what constitutes reality is something of a moveable feast depending on the structure of the perceptual systems being used. Reality is subjective.
Sunday, 25 January 2009
Plato's Indeterminate Dyad and the division of the unlimited
"We assume that the 'Indeterminate Dyad' is a straight line or distance, not to be interpreted as a unit distance, or as having yet been measured at all. We assume that a point (limit, monas, 'One') is placed successively in such positions that it divides the Dyad according to the ratio 1 : n, for any natural number n. Then we can describe the 'generation' of the numbers that follows. For n = 1, the Dyad is divided into two parts whose ratio is 1 : 1. This may interpreted as the 'generation' of Twoness out of Oneness (1 : 1 = 1) and the Dyad, since we have divided the Dyad into two equal parts. Having thus 'generated' the number 2, we can divide the Dyad according to the ratio 1 : 2 (and the larger of the ensuing sections, as before, according to the ratio 1 : 1), thus generating three equal parts and the number 3; generally, the 'generation' of a number n gives rise to a division of the Dyad in the ration 1 : n, and with this, to the 'generation' of the number n + 1. (And in each stage the 'One' intervenes afresh as he point which introduces a limit or form or measure into the otherwise 'indeterminate' Dyad to create a new number...
Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, (Routledge, p. 122, n. 35)
Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, (Routledge, p. 122, n. 35)
Saturday, 17 January 2009
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